The University of Texas and the SEC

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So Texas A&M is bound for the SEC.  Two questions arise.

One.  Why does the SEC want A&M?  Two.  Why is (what's left of) the Big 12 just sitting there?

One answer seems to work for both questions.

The University of Texas is moving to the SEC.

["Aha!  Watson, the game is afoot."  Basil Rathbone was the most famous Holmes, but the picture and link here remind us of an earlier monster movie role.]

Logic.  None of the so-called "equity conferences" needs to add anybody unless they bring enough revenue potential with them to raise the conference average (this could happen by increasing conference membership to 12 so there can be a Conference Championship).  A&M alone does not do this for the SEC, but A&M and Texas fits the bill.  And the strategy is enviable--first make sure that A&M wants to go so there is no interference from the Texas legislature.  Not only was there no interference, but the board of regents (all appointed by the governor) has already given its blessing.  For those doubters--who raises the average for the SEC besides Texas?  Somebody from the ACC?  Miami is now a leper and that leaves FSU or Clemson.  Nope.

Logic.  What's left of the Big 12 sits there because there really are only two teams that fit the "raise the average" requirement, BYU and Notre Dame (let's not even get started on the likes of Boise State or Houston, economically weak sisters).  Even if BYU would come (they could have just said so when they went independent, but they didn't), ND has made it clear by passing on the Big Ten that they prefer independence.  So what's left of the Big 12 may not even be able to get back to 10 teams, let alone the 12 that it takes for a believable Conference Championship.  And Texas knows this.  If they stay, it's the annual Texas-Oklahoma game and that's it.  Since the Longhorn Network is only of value to people in the state of Texas, it is completely portable and no threat to the SEC Network.

Prediction Consistent with the Logic.  Oklahoma and ND join the Big Ten (or Oklahoma and Mizzou, if ND stays indie).  That makes two conferences of 14.  The Pac 12 is right behind with BYU and somebody to go to 14 (the Pac has always been the weaker of the Big 4 and will have to settle for "somebody" to round out 14; I think Oklahoma State, but maybe this is Boise State's big chance).

Logic.  This allows the BCS to squeeze more schools out of the "equity conference" distinction.  The BCS would benefit from dumping the Big East and, if both of the premier Texas schools move to the SEC, and Oklahoma moves to the Big Ten, the BCS can dump the remaining Big Rest as well.  That makes 4 equity conferences rather than 6; the money gets preserved for fewer teams.

Slowly but surely, the Big 12 is working its way backward through history.  Originally, the Big 12 was the Big 6 and then the Big 8.  It never would have made it past 8 if it weren't for the wandering Texans-- Texas, Texas A&M, Baylor, and Texas Tech left the SWC to join the Big 8 in 1994.  That move was the final nail in the coffin of the SWC.  The move of A&M to the SEC, soon to be followed by Texas, and ultimately Oklahoma, signals the end of the Big 12 as well.

Gimme that old time Monster

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Went with the wife and friends to see Cowboys and Aliens.  It was an OK popcorn muncher.  But I was disappointed since I had higher expectations of a Jon Favreau film.  Where's the depth of treatment of...THE MONSTER?

So, to console myself, the next day I watched The Thing From Another World (1951).  Back when men were men, women laughed at them all the time, and a monster was really the star of the show.

All the news that's fit to print (and a wacky opinion)

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Talking about wins and losses from the upcoming NFL bargaining settlement, this from Judy Battista at the NYT:


"A new rookie wage system in which even the top picks in the 2011 draft could sign contracts worth about half of what the top pics signed for in 2010, a concession by players."


Wow.  Current players conceding the earnings of rookies yet to enter the league doesn't seem like much of a concession, especially when...(later in the article):


"And in a boon for players, each team will be expected to be required to spend — in cash, not in tricky accounting — a total of 90 percent of the salary cap."


So... rookies get their entering deals cut by half and owner have agreed to spend it all on current players.  For current players, like Eric Cartman always says on South Park, "Pretty sweet."

Observations on San Diego

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Sorry a break in the posts.  I was traveling.  Part of it to the WEAI Meetings where sports economists gather for many reasons--history, academic fellowship, and, well, it was San Diego.

I counted 17 sessions and 68 papers.

Observations:

1. All of the sessions were "sponsored" by the North American Association of Sports Economists (NAASE). 
2. All of the sessions were organized by Dave Berri (Southern Utah University), Brad Humphreys (University of Alberta), and Tony Krautmann (DePaul University).
3. The Gini coefficient on the number of times a colleague's name appears as an author on the 68 papers was 19.5 (Berri, 7; Humphreys 6; one other person with 5, 14 people with 2, and 87 with 1).  This is pretty equal; the Gini on income inequality in the U.S. in 2009 was 46.8 and in the EU in 2005 31.0.
4. The Gini coefficient on the number of times a university name appears for the 68 papers is 35.4 (University of Alberta, 11; Southern Utah, 8; Michigan and Lancaster, 6; 3 others with 4; 5 others with 3; 17 others with 2; and 45 others appear once).  This is pretty unequal; worse than income inequality in the EU but not quite as bad as income inequality in the U.S.
5. I also categorized the papers into 7 groups, Labor/Discrimination/PEDs (23), I-O/Contests/Balance (17), Production (9), Demand/Attendance (8), Policy/Participation (3), Facilities/Development (3), Others (2).  The Gini coefficient on topics indicates decided inequality at 44.1.

On item 1, there are two other associations.  On items 2-4, I leave readers to their own conclusions.  On the last item, while any categorization is subjective, perhaps we need to branch out a bit?

Turning investment in college sports upside down

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Not to pick on a particular purveyor, only to note a clearly stated poor conclusion, I've commented at Kristi Dosh's Business of College Sports.

She shows 22 athletic departments that more than broke even and goes off into the usual, upside down, conclusion that somehow university administrator investment in athletics, unlike anything else they invest in, are made from the perspective of covering overspending by ADs.

Sigh.  So many mis-perceptions, so little time.

Join the fun there, or go ahead and post here.

Expansion versus Relocation

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OK.  So various sources report:


AEG president Tim Leiweke said that Philip Anschutz is prepared to purchase majority interest in a team.  AEG has spoken to the Vikings, Chargers, Rams, Raiders, and Jaguars.  [Some reports include that some of these teams deny it.]


Let's leave aside the interesting question ownership motivation.


We all know that the tradeoff for the current group of team owners that comprise the NFL is in terms of what should be a pretty "monstrous" expansion fee v. what they can extract from allowing an owner to move an existing team (a supermajority must OK the move).


Which will it be Sports Economics Fans?  Expansion or relocation?

While strolling through the lit one day...

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I came upon a piece in the Atlantic Economic Journal by Paul and Weinbach.  It's about minor league hockey demand.

And it cites nothing recent about hockey demand at all.  Like I said in my initial post, Sports Economists appear to have a difficult time acknowledging their heritage.

See (and the cites therein):

Fort and Winfree.  2008.  "Fan Substitution and the 2004-05 NHL Lockout."  JSE, 9, 425-434.

Winfree.  2009.  "Owner Incentives During the 2004-05 NHL Lockout."  Applied Econ, 41, 3275-3285.